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As urban housing grows increasingly unaffordable, city-dwelling millennials 
are forced to consider novel ways to pay the rent.1  The intersection of
costs outpacing a reasonable share of income, demand for short-term
housing, and ubiquitous personal technology has spawned an entire
“room-sharing” industry, dominated by start-up Airbnb.2  Facilitated by 
Airbnb’s smartphone application, millennials open up their condominiums, 
houses, and apartments to complete strangers for short-term use.  But, 
with the growth of the room-sharing economy come concerns for its 
participants, such as apportioning liability and, the focus of this Comment, 
determining how room-sharing fits within existing regulatory schemes.
Room-sharing hosts turn to applications such as Airbnb, usually without 
fully understanding the legal consequences of room-sharing in their
jurisdiction. For instance, New York City resident Nigel Warren turned
his condominium into a source of income by renting it out to strangers for 
$100 per night.3  Warren—like thousands of others—used Airbnb to find
travelers who needed temporary housing during days when he was away
on vacation.4 
After one trip in September 2012, however, Warren returned home to a 
surprise. During his absence, special enforcement officers had shown up
at his apartment, levying $2,400 in fines on his unsuspecting landlord.5 
While Warren’s guest, a foreign tourist, took advantage of a below-
market-cost stay, Warren faced breaking his lease and potential criminal
 1. See Patrick Clark, The Exact Moment Big Cities Got Too Expensive for Millennials, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (July 15, 2015, 8:38 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-07-15/the-exact-moment-big-cities-got-too-expensive-for-millennials [https://perma.cc/
U9GA-PLY9], for a survey of the percentage of income paid by a typical millennial for
rent in nine major U.S. cities. Clark finds that in all but two of these cities, rent, on average,
costs more than the maximum acceptable 30% of renters’ income.  In six of these cities,
rent’s outpacing income is a recent phenomenon, starting in the early 2000s.  Id.
2. Airbnb is an internet-based platform, connecting hosts who offer accommodations 
with guests. See About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us [https://perma. 
cc/Y2KW-P3WJ] (last visited May 15, 2016).  When a prospective “Guest” and “Host”
agree on price and terms, Airbnb facilitates the transaction, taking a portion of the rental
price. See Airbnb Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms/ [https://perma.
cc/SEL5-282M] (last updated Mar. 29, 2016).  For further discussion of Airbnb, see notes 
12–23 and accompanying text. 
3. See Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 
2012, at B1, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb­
hosts-who-may-be-breaking-the-law.html?pagewanted=all. 
4. City of New York v. Carrey, NOV 35006622J, at 4 (Environmental Control 
Board May 9, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/142650911/Decision-and-Order-for­
NOV-35006622J.  Warren’s description on the Airbnb website described a two-bedroom 
apartment with a “low-key and truly awesome” roommate.  Id. at 4 n.5. 
5. Id. at 1; see Lieber, supra note 3.
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charges for operating an illegal hotel.6  On appeal, the Environmental 
Control Board dismissed the fines against Warren, reasoning he was not 
operating an illegal hotel because his roommate was present.7  The Board 
reasoned “occupancy of the cited . . . apartment by a tourist for less than 
thirty consecutive days while a permanent occupant was present in the 
apartment [was] consistent with using such apartment for permanent resident
purposes.”8 
Since Warren’s case, New York’s attorney general, Eric Schneiderman,
has focused on tenants engaged in regularly renting out single-occupancy 
apartments using room-sharing platforms.9 The attorney general’s office
subpoenaed Airbnb to provide information on hosts within the state and
the gross revenue of each host and accommodation.10  The state asserted 
that hosts rented out their accommodations in violation of the New York 
Multiple Dwelling Law, which makes renting permanent residences for
periods of more than thirty days a misdemeanor, as well as various tax
laws.11  Airbnb successfully quashed the subpoena, but New York housing 
6. The City sued the condominium owner and Warren for using the space for
transient occupancy, contrary to the Certificate of Occupancy and local zoning requirements
and violating other safety standards.  See Carrey, supra note 4, at 4.  An administrative 
law judge found Warren guilty solely of changing the occupancy type, as the City had not 
shown the condominium’s use as an illegal transient hotel.  Id. at 5.
 7. See City of New York v. Carrey, Appeal Nos. 13006002 and 1300736
(Environmental Control Board Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/171532677/
City-of-New-York-v-Abe-Carrey; Lieber, supra note 3. 
8.  City of New York v. Carrey, Appeal Nos. 13006002 and 1300736 (Environmental 
Control Board Sept. 26, 2013), http://www.scribd.com/doc/171532677/City-of-New­
York-v-Abe-Carrey.
9. See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (S. Ct. 2014). Like
previous attorneys general, Schneiderman uses his office as a platform to police New York 
business, insisting that “corporations play by the rules.”  Michael Craig, Eric Schneiderman 
vs. Airbnb, N.Y. OBSERVER (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:50 PM), http://observer.com/ 2014/02/eric­
schneiderman-vs-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/BWW6-EVMY]. The increased focus on 
Airbnb and room-sharing occurred after the release of Schneiderman’s 2014 report, revealing 
most of New York City’s Airbnb rentals are illegal. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF 
N.Y., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 2 (Oct. 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3YXY-UKST].
10. Airbnb, Inc., 989 N.Y.S.2d at 788–89. 
11. Id. at 790; see N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 61 (McKinney 2015) (mandating 
compliance with local law in conducting business in a multiple dwelling).  The attorney
general argued that, in addition to Multiple Dwelling Law violations, Airbnb hosts failed
to remit the Hotel Room Occupancy Tax and state and local sales tax.  Airbnb, Inc., 989
N.Y.S.2d at 790–91. 
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agencies are clearly willing to press charges against hosts violating state 
and city laws.12 
Further complicating matters for hosts is that municipalities may interpret
their codes to bar room-sharing, even if the code does not, on its face,
contain any provision that governs room-sharing.  In a close-to-home 
example, the City of San Diego assessed $22,400 in civil penalties against
homeowner Rachel Smith for using Airbnb to rent out rooms in her historic
craftsman home near Balboa Park for $80 nightly.13 While no San Diego 
code provision specifically addresses room-sharing, the court reasoned that
room-sharing potentially implicates several sections: permissible rentals to a
single boarder for more than thirty days, hotels, rooming houses, or
bed and breakfasts.14  Because she operated an illegal bed and breakfast
for at least part of the time, the court found Smith liable.15 
But Smith maintains that the bed-and-breakfast section’s applicability
is unclear, depending on whether her rentals were “primarily to friends 
and family” or “primarily to visitors and tourists.”16  In agreement with 
Smith, Airbnb sent an open letter to San Diego’s mayor and city council, 
calling for the council to “suspend enforcement efforts against . . . home 
sharers” while it considers ordinance and code changes to directly address
room-sharing, to clarify the confusion of Airbnb hosts such as Smith.17 
A. Overview: The Rise of the Sharing Economy18 
Airbnb and its competitors represent a recently emerging trend in
business—platforms based on peer-to-peer sharing, facilitated by the 
12. Airbnb, Inc., 989 N.Y.S.2d at 788–89, 792. Airbnb successfully quashed the
subpoena on the grounds that it was overbroad, requesting information on all Hosts in New 
York State, instead of more narrowly those who rented their apartments for less than thirty
days in violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law. Id. at 791–92. 
13.  Civil Penalties Decision and Administrative Enforcement Order, Rachel Smith 
v. San Diego, 20150107.1-SD-CES-CMM (AHP Mar. 5, 2015), ¶¶ II(5), (7); V(2), 
http://media.nbcbayarea.com/documents/AirBnB+Host+Penalites_Judges+Findings.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6N76-XZGR].
14. Id. at ¶¶ II(31–32). 
15. Id. at ¶¶ IV(12–15). 
16. Id. at ¶ II(36). 
17. Open letter from David Owen, Airbnb, to Kevin Faulconer, Mayor of San
Diego, and San Diego City Council (Aug. 12, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/
documents/2273911-airbnb-letter-to-san-diego-city-council.html [https://perma.cc/AYG4-C965].
18. While many economists use the term “sharing economy,” platforms such as
Airbnb cannot, of course, strictly be termed “sharing” because they involve profitable 
transactions. See Arun Sundararajan, Collabarative Consumption and the Sharing Economy, 
TECHONOMY (Nov. 12, 2012), http://techonomy.com/conf/12-tucson/internet-economy/
collaborative-consumption-and-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/GT5W-E48N].
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internet and replacing traditional business models.19  Technology makes 
resource-sharing ever easier, and millennials are well-versed in using new
platforms to monetize their assets.20  With the movement towards peer­
to-peer sharing, consumers transfer reliance to services rather than goods, 
reducing consumption and increasing the benefits of ownership.21  And 
while using privately owned resources to generate revenue, sharing
platforms gain an advantage over the heavily regulated industries with 
which they compete—sharing platforms can typically evade the burden of 
regulatory compliance.22 
With the advent of the sharing economy23 and widespread smartphone
ownership, innovative new platforms span a multitude of industries, allowing 
19. See Sangeet Paul Choudary, Why Business Models Fail: Pipes vs. Platform, 
WIRED (Oct. 21. 2013), http://www.wired.com/2013/10/why-business-models-fail-pipes­
vs-platforms/ [https://perma.cc/3CJV-N3CU].  Business such as Airbnb are arguably the 
next of many iterations of the “typical” business model over the last two centuries,
as business models transform from “value chains”—pipes, with value created and pushed 
out in the form of consumable goods—to platforms enabling interaction between participants 
and relying on customer participation to create value. See id. Airbnb, the most prominent 
room-sharing platform, has been extremely successful.  Between January and June 2012, 
the company doubled its business, announcing ten million nights booked.  Emily Chang, 
Airbnb Celebrates Record Growth With Over 10 Million Guest Nights Booked, MKT.
WIRED (June 19, 2012, 6:00 AM), http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/airbnb­
celebrates-record-growth-with-10-million-guest-nights-booked-1670787.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
NA9Q-BRSZ].  Early in 2014, the company secured a $450 million investment from
private equity firm TPG, making it one of the world’s most valuable startups.  Mike Spector, 
Douglas MacMillan, & Evelyn M. Rusli, TPG-Led Group Closes $450 Million Investment
in Airbnb, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 18, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB
10001424052702304626304579509800267341652. 
20. See The Power of Connection: Peer-to-Peer Businesses: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 3–4 (2014) (statement of Arun Sundararajan, Professor and
NEC Fellow, Stern School of Business, Head, Social Cities Initiative, Center for Urban
Science and Progress, New York University), http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploaded files/1­
15-2014_revised_sundararajan_testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/2U3S-SN59].  Sundararajan, an
economist specializing in the sharing economy, lists “consumerization of digital technologies,”
“emergence of ‘digital institutions,’” “[u]rbanization and globalization,” and “[e]cological 
and resource concerns” as key factors promoting the rise of the peer economy. Id.
 21. Sundararajan, supra note 20. 
22. See Bruce Watson, Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: The Tip of the Iceberg for the 
Sharing Economy?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013, 5:19 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
sustainable-business/airbnb-legal-trouble-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/KC8F-86XS]. 
23. A recent PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that 19% of American adults 
have engaged in a sharing economy transaction.  PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, The
Sharing Economy: Consumer Intelligence Series 8 (2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/ 
industry/entertainment-media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/assets/pwc-cis­
sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8DX-7TGW] [hereinafter The Sharing Economy]. 
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users to monetize personal belongings from bathrooms to parking spaces.24 
For the savvy smartphone user, a ride to her destination in another’s
private car, a share in someone’s leftovers, and even a stranger to watch
her pet are only a few taps away.25  Sharing companies are strong competitors
in many industries—the pink-mustached visages of cars operated by taxi
competitor Lyft, for example, are likely familiar to most readers.26 
Mirroring the success of companies Lyft and Uber within the taxi
industry, Airbnb, the largest room-sharing company, has fast emerged as 
a heavy contender within the hotel industry—Airbnb averages almost half
a million guests per night, nearly 22% more than Hilton Worldwide.27 
Airbnb, founded in San Francisco in 2008, now lists rentals including rooms,
apartments, and entire homes in tens of thousands of cities worldwide.28 
Aspiring hosts and guests register on the Airbnb website, creating profiles 
that allow them to either offer unused space for rent or search listings to 
temporarily lease a room or entire dwelling.29  Although Airbnb does not
personally interview either hosts or guests, the company maintains that its
 24. See, e.g.,  VINTED, www.vinted.com [https://perma.cc/DH5R-L429] (last visited 
May 15, 2016) (enabling buying, selling, or swapping pre-owned clothes); SPINLISTER,
https://www.spinlister.com [https://perma.cc/RT83-5MDW]  (last visited May 15, 2016) 
(renting others’ bicycles or snowboarding or surfing equipment); JUSTPARK, www.just 
park.com [https://perma.cc/SFV7-S6NM] (last visited May 15, 2016) (connecting those in
possession of parking spaces with others willing to rent the spaces); AIRPNP, http://www.
airpnp.co [https://perma.cc/8RJX-45P2] (last visited May 15, 2016) (providing private 
bathrooms); FEASTLY, www.eatfeastly.com [https://perma.cc/V5U3-H8T6] (last visited 
May 15, 2016) (connecting dining guests with eager home chefs).
25. See LEFTOVER SWAP, http://www.leftoverswap.com [https://perma.cc/F9M3­
HLW6] (last visited May 15, 2016); TURO, https://turo.com [https://perma.cc/VY36­
AZEM](last visited May 15, 2016) (allowing strangers to rent idle cars for a daily fee); 
DOGVACAY, http://www.dogvacay.com [https://perma.cc/DEF8-L5AB] (last visited May
15, 2016) (linking vacationing pet owners with people willing to pet sit). 
26. Lyft, Uber, and Airbnb are all “rental” services, repurposing peers’ property
and increasing the scope of an existing industry. See Sundararajan, supra note 20, at 2. 
27. The Sharing Economy, supra note 23, at 14.
28. The concept behind Airbnb began when two San Franciscan roommates started 
hosting overnight guests in their apartment in order to pay their rent.  Realizing others 
renters would be willing to host impromptu bed-and-breakfasts of their own, the roommates
developed a website to connect travelers with empty rooms and couches.  Christine Lagorio-
Chafkin, Brian Chesky, Joe Gebbia, and Nathan Blecharczyk, Founders of AirBnB, INC. 
(July 19, 2010), http://www.inc.com/30under30/2010/profile-brian-chesky-joe-gebbia­
nathan-blecharczyk-airbnb.html.  With eager investors contributing millions, the company 
grew quickly, and is worth $13 billion as of 2015—more than Hyatt Hotels. The Sharing
Economy, supra note 23, at 23. 
29. See Airbnb Terms of Service, supra note 2.  This Comment uses the term guest
consistently with Airbnb’s terms of service: one renting a room or dwelling through a 
sharing platform, rather than a social visitor.
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verification mechanisms ensure the safety of both parties.30  After creating 
an account and verifying their identities using a social media profile, photo
identification, or other mechanism, guests and hosts may view ratings and
reviews left by other site users to provide further assurance of a profile’s 
veracity.31 
For guests, Airbnb—and similar platforms—offer accommodations at 
a substantial discount from hotel prices.32  And for renters or property owners 
in popular destinations, well-managed Airbnb postings can be very lucrative.33 
But as Smith, Warren, and other hosts have discovered, room-sharing is 
not a risk-free source of income.
This Comment argues that the sharing economy, particularly room-
sharing, is here to stay and that it represents an untapped source of funding 
for municipalities.  It analyzes whether the room-sharing market should 
be regulated and ultimately advocates for municipalities to enact regulations
tailored to the needs of their communities.  Part II argues that government 
30. See What Are Verifications?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/336
[https://perma.cc/Z6LZ-ZSVK] (last visited May 15, 2016).  Airbnb offers a variety of
verification mechanisms: confirming an email address or phone number, connecting your
profile to a Facebook, LinkedIn, or Google account, using pre-existing or reviews,
completing reservations, and having professional photographs of the rental space uploaded.  See
How Do I Get Verifications?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/269 [https://
perma.cc/EG4J-AQZS] (last visited May 15, 2016).  Completing the verification process 
results in the addition of a “Verified ID” badge to a profile, which Airbnb says users find 
“useful when deciding who to interact with on Airbnb.” What is Verified ID?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/450 [https://perma.cc/Y7BF-GQP9] (last visited May
15, 2016).  These mechanisms appear a somewhat superficial increase in security, motivated
more to placate users than truly prevent fraud—neither Facebook nor any other social media
platform used to “verify” Airbnb accounts investigates the veracity of its users’ profile 
information until false profiles have been reported. See, e.g., How Do I Report a Fake
Account?, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/help/167722253287296 [https://perma.cc/5LFX­
LJGZ] (last visited May 15, 2016). 
31. See What Are Verifications?, supra note 30. 
32. A 2013 comparison found entire-apartment rentals facilitated by Airbnb were
on average about 20% less than a hotel room and single room rentals through Airbnb were 
typically half the price of a hotel room. Airbnb vs. Hotels: A Price Comparison, PRICEONOMICS
(June 17, 2013), http://priceonomics.com/hotels/ [https://perma.cc/ZJ7C-CKW5]. 
33. Particularly if hosting is more than just an occasional activity—for instance, a
“professional” Airbnb host documented the economics of hosting in a $40,000 Las Vegas 
apartment he purchased solely to rent on Airbnb.  Jon Wheatley, I Bought an Apartment to
Rent Out on Airbnb, NEED/WANT (Oct. 28, 2013, 2:48 AM), http://needwant. com/p/buying­
apartment-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/C6JN-6CS7]. His costs included $10,000 for renovating
and furnishing the apartment and $200 monthly for a third party to manage and clean the 
apartment. Id. After a year, his total profit was over $13,000.  Id.
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intervention is necessary in this market, responding to the idea of laissez­
faire regulation of the sharing economy and examining the parallels 
between policies for hotel regulation and room-sharing concerns.  Part III 
analyzes existing regulations, particularly focusing on laws governing
hotels and whether they will likely apply to room-sharing hosts.  Part IV 
focuses on the legality of room-sharing in New York City, San Francisco,
and Portland, Oregon—cities acknowledging potential issues with room-
sharing and illustrating several approaches to the sharing economy,
varying from hostile to relatively welcoming.  Finally, Part V criticizes
retrofitting existing regulation to fit the sharing economy, proposing a 
new, quota-based regulatory model. 
II. SHOULD ROOM-SHARING BE REGULATED? 
From the perspective of supporters of the sharing economy, there is no
reason to place a regulatory burden on participants.  Supporters tout the 
affordability, convenience, promotion of community values, and benefit 
to the environment resulting from the sharing economy as advantages over
traditional models.  Airbnb, for instance, claims “using Airbnb promotes a
more efficient use of existing resources and is an environmentally
sustainable way to travel.”34  According to one study commissioned by
Airbnb, Airbnb guests use less water and its hosts fewer harsh cleaning 
chemicals than guests of their commercial hotel counterparts.35 
At least the environmental impact claims seem somewhat dubious. 
Studies like the one commissioned by Airbnb certainly lend support to the 
idea that the cost-conscious millennials who are likely to use room-sharing 
platforms are a more environmentally conscious group of consumers.36 
But this does not necessarily support the idea that room-sharing is actually
causing consumers to be more environmentally conscious.  Rather, such
 34. A Greener Way to Travel: The Environmental Impacts of Home Sharing, 
AIRBNB (July 31, 2014), http://blog.airbnb.com/environmental-impacts-of-home-sharing/
[https://perma.cc/FZC6-4ZFP].
35. Id.  Airbnb compared 8,000 survey results from guests and hosts with “some of
the most sustainable” hotels and claimed the results showed Airbnb hosts and guests are 
more environmentally aware and follow more sustainable practices than their hotel
counterparts.  Id. 
36. See Kari Mercer Dalton, Bridging the Digital Divide and Guiding the
Millennial Generation’s Research and Analysis, 18 BARRY L. REV. 167, 173 (2012)
(explaining research suggests millennials are more environmentally-conscious than their
predecessors (citing Diana Oblinger & James Oblinger, Is it Age of IT: First Steps Toward
Understanding the Net Generation, in  EDUCATING THE NET GENERATION 2.1, 2.7 
(EDUCAUSE ed., 2005); Irina Ozolina, At Youth Summit Environmental Issues are a 
Prime Concern for Millennials, POLICY.MIC (June 6, 2012), https://mic.com/articles/
9300/at-youth-summit-environmental-issues-are-a-prime-concern-for-millennials#.3YFm84spa 
[https://perma.cc/AAN9-EXD9])); A Greener Way to Travel, supra note 34. 
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claims suggest corporate greenwashing to appeal to an environmentally
conscious customer base—part of Airbnb’s efforts to brand itself to
compete with established hospitality businesses.37 
The other benefits of the sharing economy, in contrast, are more apparent. 
Peer-to-peer sharing allows “access to many things that we need without 
having to own them all by ourselves,” lessening consumption of durable
goods.38  The sharing economy probably does encourage trusting strangers
and build stronger communities.39  And it stimulates new consumption by
raising productivity and catalyzing individual innovation and
entrepreneurship.40  In New York City, for instance, Airbnb claims that
in one year, room-sharing activity facilitated by its platform resulted in 
$632 million in economic activity in the city.41  In high-rent cities, Airbnb 
also helps hosts keep their homes by providing supplemental income.42
 37. Greenwashing is “what happens when a hopeful public eager to behave . . . is
presented with ‘evidence’ that makes an industry . . . seem friendly to the environment 
when, in fact [it] . . . is not as wholly amicable as it . . . might be.”  JANE HOFFMAN &
MICHAEL HOFFMAN, GREEN: YOUR PLACE IN THE NEW ENERGY REVOLUTION 67 (2008). 
38. JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 4 (2012). 
39. See The Sharing Economy, supra note 23, at 9; The Power of Connection: Peer-
to-Peer Businesses: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. 2 (2014) 
(statement of Philip Auerswald, Associate Professor, School of Public Policy, George
Mason University) http://smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/1-15-2014_revised_auerswald
_testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TB7-GCVA]. (stating that the peer-to-peer economy
represents a return to a past before brand names, consumerism, and personalized services,
nostalgically evoking the “distinctly American character” of sharing platforms). 
For an example of a more specific benefit of at least one segment of the sharing 
economy, see Brad N. Greenwood & Sunil Wattal, Show Me the Way to Go Home: An
Empirical Investigation of Ride Sharing and Alcohol Related Motor Vehicle Homicide 
(Jan. 29, 2015) (unpublished research paper), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2557612 [https://perma.cc/MYY6-J8PB].  Greenwood and Wattal examined
statistics of California highway accidents, finding that the presence of ridesharing application
Uber reduced the incidence of motor vehicle homicides due to intoxication by 3.6%–5.6%. 
Id. at 2–3, 21. 
40. See Sundararajan, supra note 20, at 5. 
41. Airbnb Economic Impact, AIRBNB, http://blog.airbnb.com/economic-impact­
airbnb/?_ga=1.134296569.945248043.1451258873#new-york [https://perma.cc/4U2B-SUQV] 
(last visited May 15, 2016).  Unfortunately, it is unclear the extent to which this economic
activity was in addition to, rather than supplanting, the traditional hotel industry. Airbnb
visitors on average spend an additional 2.9 days compared to hotel guests. Id.; see also
infra note 43. 
42. See Airbnb Economic Impact, supra note 41 (reporting “62[%] of Airbnb
hosts say Airbnb helped them stay in their homes” and most hosts are nontraditional 
workers, without reliable sources of income).
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While the extent of room-sharing’s replacing traditional hospitality 
arrangements is disputed,43 room-sharing benefits consumers by providing
them with more than just a price break.  Consumers also obtain the option 
of locally owned alternatives to the hotel industry, which is dominated by
gigantic corporate hotel groups in the United States.44 Airbnb guests not
only usually obtain better pricing, but also more authentic experiences of
“local flavor,” an important consideration for many consumers—and one 
that is difficult for established brands to compete with.45 
At least some regulation is uncontroversial—Airbnb itself encourages 
hosts to collect and remit local taxes and in some cities, Airbnb even collects 
tax on the hosts’ behalf by arrangement with local authority.46  Sharing
platform users should not be able to circumvent paying taxes, particularly 
when municipalities greatly need tax income.47  Taxation is a promising
43. Both Airbnb and major hotel chains maintain that room-sharing does not 
significantly impact the hotel industry.  Georgios Zervas et al., The Rise of the Sharing
Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry 2 (Boston Univ. Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2013-16, 2015) (“[H]otel executives have publicly issued 
largely dismissive statements regarding competitors like Airbnb, arguing that these peer­
to-peer platforms are either a small niche market or that they target complementary market 
segments from that targeted by hotel chains.”).  But third-party estimates have found room-
sharing results in decreases in local hotel revenue of up to 10% in certain areas. See, e.g.,
id. at 3 (“[C]omparing differences in revenue for hotels in cities affected by Airbnb before 
and after Airbnb’s entry against a baseline of differences in revenue for hotel in cities
unaffected by Airbnb over the same period of time[,] . . .  we find that, in Texas, each
additional 10% increase in the size of the Airbnb market resulted in a 0.37% decrease in 
hotel room revenue . . . resulting in an estimated revenue impact of over 8-10% for the 
most vulnerable hotels in our data.”).
44. MKG Group, U.S. Hotel Groups Still Dominate at Home with Hilton Leading
the Pack, HOTEL ONLINE (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.hotel-online.com/News/PR2011
_3rd/Sep11_USGroupMarketShare.html [https://perma.cc/558S-K44T].
45. The Sharing Economy, supra note 23, at 24. 
46. See What Is Occupancy Tax? Do I Need to Collect or Pay It?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/654/what-is-occupancy-tax—do-i-need-to-collect­
or-pay-it [https://perma.cc/T2MW-A7HW] (last visited May 15, 2016) (“We want to help
hosts follow the laws relevant to them, and we understand that many of these rules are 
complex and difficult to follow.  We’re continuing to work with governments across the
world to explore ways to help facilitate occupancy tax collection in as many locations as 
possible.”).  Airbnb collects and remits local taxes on behalf of hosts in some U.S. cities— 
Washington, D.C.; Malibu, Oakland, Palo Alto, San Diego, San Francisco, San Jose, Santa
Clara, and Santa Monica, California; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Phoenix, Arizona—
and states—Florida, Illinois, Oregon, North Carolina, Rhode Island, and Washington. In What
Areas Is Occupancy Tax Collection and Remittance by Airbnb Available?, AIRBNB.COM, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/653/in-what-areas-is-occupancy-tax-collection-and-
remittance-by-airbnb-available [https://perma.cc/PS5D-TAV5] (last visited May 15, 2016). 
47. See Scott M. Susko & Lucia Cucu, State and Local Governments Turn to Online
Business for Tax Revenue in an Attempt to Remedy Budget Shortfalls, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N &
INCENTIVES, Sept. 2009, at 14 (noting the increase of municipal budget woes, particularly
on the heels of the recession). 
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source of municipal income in cities where room-sharing is prevalent and 
falls under a variety of local tax regulations, including occupancy, lodging,
sales, tourist, or hotel taxes.48  As municipalities increasingly face high amounts
of debt and even the likelihood of bankruptcy, it is only fair for room-sharing
participants to bear their share of the tax burden.49 
The focus of this Comment is not taxation, however, but the more
controversial position that room-sharing should be monitored by local 
authorities to ensure consumer safety and minimize its impact on 
communities.50  While new technology should not be banned merely
because it does not fit within existing regulatory schemes, innovation 
should not allow room-sharing platforms to escape regulation entirely.51 
Consumer safety has long been guarded by legislation in housing, securities, 
the workplace, food and drug, and other industries.52  Because of technological
advances, the time has come for reform focused on the sharing economy.53
 48. See Expedia, Inc. v. New York Dep’t of Fin., 22 N.Y.3d 121, 124 (2013); T.J. 
Evans, Case Note, Online Travel Companies Find Issues with Hotels Extremely Taxing: 
Georgia’s Hotel-Motel Occupancy Excise Tax and Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 61 
MERCER L. REV. 1263, 1273 (Summer 2010) (describing taxability of online travel
companies in Georgia); see infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
49. WAYNE H. WINEGARDEN, PACIFIC RESEARCH INSTITUTE, GOING BROKE ONE 
CITY AT A TIME: MUNICIPAL BANKRUPTCIES IN AMERICA 3 (Jan. 2014), http://www.pacific 
research.org/fileadmin/templates/pri/images/Studies/PDFs/2013-2015/MunicipalBankruptcy
2014_F.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYP2-TEQD] (noting economic weakness and liabilities for 
pensions and retirement benefits as factors increasing the likelihood of municipal bankruptcies 
in the coming years).
50.  Recently, for instance, a man died after swinging on a rope swing at an Airbnb
rental, when the tree branch supporting the swing broke.  Zak Stone, Living and Dying on 
Airbnb, MEDIUM (Nov. 8, 2015), https://medium.com/matter/living-and-dying-on-airbnb­
6bff8d600c04#.8tx7dsg8i [https://perma.cc/L78Y-KPHQ].  Most homeowner’s insurance
policies do not cover commercial use of the home—Airbnb offers secondary coverage up
to $1 million, but if Airbnb refuses to provide coverage or if the amount sought exceeds 
the coverage, renters face personal liability. See Ron Lieber, A Liability Risk for Airbnb 
Hosts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/06/your-money/airbnb- 
offers-homeowner-liability-coverage-but-hosts-still-have-risks.html?r=0.
51. For the contrary position, see Roberta A. Kaplan, Regulation and the Sharing
Economy, N.Y. L.J. 1, July 18, 2014 (“Although incumbents tend to portray disruptive 
innovation as ‘evading’ established systems of regulation, this is true only in the sense that 
the automobile ‘evaded’ the horse tax and saddle regulations.”).
52. See Daniel B. Klein, Consumer Protection, in  CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ECONOMICS 81–83 (David R. Henderson ed., 2008). 
53. For a discussion of the ways in which industry forces challenge consumer protection
laws, see, for example, Mark E. Budnitz, The Development of Consumer Protection Law, 
the Institutionalization of Consumerism, & Future Prospects & Perils, 26 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1147, 1181–98 (2010). 
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Airbnb and other room-sharing platforms are examples of technological 
innovation outstripping consumer protections.  By eschewing the traditional 
hospitality industry, guests trust hosts to provide safe and legal rooms, 
putting themselves at risk when staying in any of tens of thousands of
room-sharing listings.
Neither are participants in the hospitality industry traditionally
unregulated—hoteliers, room-sharing hosts’ commercial counterparts, are 
uncontroversially subject to a variety of duties and laws.54  At common
law, for example, the innkeeper historically had three duties to his guests:
to provide shelter, to safeguard them from harm, and to furnish “wholesome”
food.55  Although modern jurisprudence lessens the common law’s application 
of strict liability to hotel operators, hotels nevertheless maintain duties to 
provide courteous treatment and safe accommodations or else face paying 
civil damages to guests.56  Hoteliers are not insurers of the safety of their 
guests, but the law presupposes a duty of care for hotel operators to furnish 
safe appliances and premises as well as warn guests of any hidden dangers.57 
Beyond these tort doctrines, legislation also creates criminal punishment
for hotels failing to meet certain standards, inducing safer practices in the 
hospitality industry.58 
These duties stem from the concept that hotels and inns, by soliciting 
consumers to frequent their establishments, are not “blameless” for injuries
incurred at their establishments.59  Ideally, hotels are as “safe and secure 
54. See  THOMAS A. DICKERSON, TRAVEL LAW § 4.02[1] (1992) (suggesting that 
hotel law stems from the simple premise that “a hotel must be as safe and secure as one’s 
home”).
55. JOHN H. SHERRY, THE LAWS OF INNKEEPERS 157 (1972). 
56. DICKERSON, supra note 54. See Penchas v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 590 N.Y.S.2d 
669, 670 (Sup. Ct. 1992) (noting that the law has historically held innkeepers to a high
level of care, as inns were safe havens on dangerous highways where travelers expected 
protection from thieves and the elements). 
57. See, e.g., Dye-Washburn Hotel Co. v. Aldridge, 93 So. 512, 514–15 (Ala. 
1922); Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis, 114 N.E.2d 873, 875–76 (Ind. 1953); Connelly v. 
Family Inns of Am., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 38, 41, 45 (N.C. 2000); Barnes v. Hotel O. Henry
Corp., 51 S.E.2d 180, 181–82 (N.C. 1949).  Liability is not unlimited, however; state 
statutes in every state limit the liability of innkeepers to hosts.  Jeffrey Miller, Feature, 
Hospitality Law, GEN. PRAC., SOLO & SMALL FIRM DIV., April–May 2010, at 14, 15–16. 
58. See infra Section III.A. 
59.	  Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698, 709 (1986). 
By inviting customers in order to secure financial gain, an enterprise fosters 
crime. It provides a pool of victims and booty in a convenient location for
potential wrongdoers. The enterprise is also in a position to take advance measures 
to avoid the danger. . . . The government’s general responsibility for law enforcement 
does not eliminate the business’s separate duty to supplement public compensation 
and public protection.
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as one’s home”60—but they tend to be particularly dangerous when guests 
are in a new area, unfamiliar with local dangers, without acquaintances, 
and easy targets for criminals.61 
The same characteristics that make hotel guests as a class particularly 
vulnerable also provide support for regulating the room-sharing industry.62 
Just like traditional host guests, room-sharing guests contract with a host, 
abide by the terms of a contract provided by the sharing platform, and stay
in a location for a limited period of time.63  And like a hotel guest, a room-
sharing guest stays in an unfamiliar residence and is unacquainted with 
the surroundings, so the same safety requirements, such as posting signs
for fire exits or having carbon monoxide detectors, should apply to room-
sharing hosts.64  Additionally, hosts represent themselves as innkeepers, so to
speak, by advertising lodging on an online platform.65 Once homeowners 
or apartment tenants hire out a room to the general public, they are no 
longer using their property merely for private purposes.66 
Granted, hosts and hotels are not interchangeable: hosts are private 
persons, less sophisticated and less able to bear risk.67 While hotels are
generally financially secure enough to spread losses, a private person 
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 442B (1965); Gary S. Becker, Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
1, 35 (Gary S. Becker & William M. Landes eds., 1974)). 
60. DICKERSON, supra note 54. 
61. See Zacharias, supra note 59, at 744.  However, few contemporary hotel 
locations resemble their Medieval English predecessors, where roads were “infested with
outlaws and robbers of all sorts” and hotels were essential for “protection at night from 
thieves and outlaws.”  SHERRY, supra note 55, at 3. 
62. See Zacharias, supra note 59, at 744.
63. See Terms of Service, supra note 2. 
64. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. RESID. LAW § 56 (McKinney 1951) (“Every means of
egress [in a hotel or similar dwelling] shall be indicated by a sign reading “EXIT” in red 
letters at least eight inches high on a white background, or vice versa.”). 
65. See SHERRY, supra note 55, at 157. Sherry defines an innkeeper by “the 
profession of readiness to serve the public need,” explaining “it is enough that by word or 
act the innkeeper makes public his intention to become such.” Id. at 17.  Although
examples of methods of soliciting the public do not include creating an online profile, 
using a sharing platform website to advertise an available room is similar to “advertising, . . .
keeping a public register, [or] . . . running a coach to a railroad station.”  Id.
 66. Id. at 32.  Some 19th century cases dealt with private individuals receiving
members of the public into their houses, reasoning that the distinction between an
innkeeper and a private individual was a question of fact.  Id.  At least one case held that
a homeowner may maintain his house is private, yet be an innkeeper by holding himself 
out to the public as a course of business.  SHERRY, supra note 55, at 10–12. 
67. See discussion supra notes 54–57. 
 481



















   
   
 








   
    
 




   
 
  
renting out an apartment will likely be unable to afford any damages.68 
Because Airbnb and other sharing platforms limit their responsibility by 
maintaining their status as facilitators and not parties to the contract, the 
individual hosts are the ones who must bear the cost of breaking the law.69 
Rather than impracticability, some argue that room-sharing need not be 
regulated because internal incentives are adequate to ensure consumer
safety.70  In January 2014, economist Arun Sundararajan testified before
the House of Representatives, explaining that the peer economy should be 
left to regulate itself:
The interests of the platforms are well aligned with facilitating safe and profitable
peer-to-peer trade (since their revenues are directly linked to the volume and
continued growth of such trade). The platforms are also better positioned to “take 
action” against infringing entrepreneurs and consumers (for example, by simply
disconnecting them from the platform).71 
But Airbnb confounds a laissez-faire approach.72  The company and its
competitors do not have a direct incentive to encourage compliance with
applicable laws because they are effectively insulated from liability.73 
Airbnb’s terms of service state “AIRBNB HAS NO CONTROL OVER
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTS, GUESTS[,] AND OTHER USERS OF THE 
SITE, APPLICATION[,] AND SERVICES OR ANY ACCOMMODATIONS, 
AND DISCLAIMS ALL LIABILITY IN THIS REGARD TO THE 
MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW.”74  And the disclaimer 
68. Airbnb does provide a “host guarantee,” similar to insurance for hosts to cover
damage to their homes or apartments. See What Is the Airbnb Host Guarantee?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/279 [https://perma.cc/JDX9-LFCT] (last visited May
15, 2016).  However, as Airbnb’s terms of use direct hosts to comply with local regulations, the
insurance will not cover fines or other penalties for breaking the law.  See Terms of Service, 
supra note 2.
 69. See Terms of Service, supra note 2. 
70. See Sundararajan, supra note 20, at 7. 
71. Id.  Sundararajan is a professor at New York University, specializing in the 
economics of digital goods and network effects. Faculty Index Page: Arun Sundararajan, 
NYU, http://www.stern.nyu.edu/faculty/bio/arun-sundararajan [https://perma.cc/3B49­
E4QG] (last visited May 15, 2016).  His scholarly research includes many works on the
impact of sharing platform businesses on the economy. Id.
72. A laissez-faire approach conceives of an ideally competitive market and 
criticizes government interference as creating “sluggish and inefficient” corporations. See 
THOMAS DONALDSON, CORPORATIONS AND MORALITY 93 (1982).  Such assumptions 
minimalize the realities of imperfectly available information, cost externalization, imperfect
competition, and other factors. Id. 
73. See Terms of Service, supra note 2 (stating that Airbnb is not liable for the 
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is likely effective, given room-sharing platforms’ limited role beyond that 
of connecting potential hosts and guests.75 
Rather than continue to ban room-sharing, cities should implement 
regulations specifically addressing room-sharing activity and lightening 
the burden of compliance for hosts.76  Hosts, who are likely not sophisticated 
parties able to decipher and comply with local law, can benefit from proactive
efforts to implement room-sharing-friendly schemes. Further, as Airbnb 
and its competitors aim to be firmly established in nearly every city, local
authorities will face practical barriers in attempting to crack down on 
illegal room-sharing under current law.77  While regulation undoubtedly 
will inhibit room-sharing to some extent, the fears regulation’s opponents 
express are less concerning than the dangers of an unmonitored, flourishing 
alternative to the heavily-regulated hotel industry.
III. SURVEY OF EXISTING REGULATION
A variety of laws govern room-sharing, but municipal regulations take 
on the most important role. Factors determining a particular host’s liability 
under most laws include whether she is an owner or renter, whether she 
remains in her residence or abandons it entirely to the guest, and for how 
many days annually she hosts guests brokered through the platform.78 
Thus, “professional” room-sharers—individuals owning multiple listings 
that are exclusively used on sharing platforms—will be most likely to be 
breaking the law.79
 75. Supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
76. Infra notes 188–211 and accompanying text. 
77. See David Matthews, Why Airbnb Is Launching a Print Magazine, FAST 
COMPANY, (Nov. 17, 2014, 11:32 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/3038652/why­
airbnb-is-launching-a-print-magazine [https://perma.cc/P64B-7Q3Z]; Steve Mertl, Quebec 
Government Targets Airbnb “Hosts” for Offering Unlicensed Accommodations, YAHOO!
NEWS CANADA (May 27, 2013), https://ca.news.yahoo.com/blogs/dailybrew/quebec­
government-targets-airbnb-hosts-offering-unlicensed-accommodations-184805349.html
[https://perma.cc/HBT2-XLFS] (explaining a city wide crackdown on room-sharing in 
Quebec would mean charging thousands of city residents with violating local laws). 
78. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940 (West 1989). In California, for instance, a host can
inadvertently become a landlord if the guest stays for more than 30 days. See id. Thus 
one Palm Springs, California host had to resort to eviction proceedings to get rid of a crafty
houseguest. See Skip Descant, Airbnb ‘Squatter’ Checks out of Palm Springs Condo, USA
TODAY (Aug. 21, 2014, 1:05 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/08/21/ 
airbnb-squatter-leaves-condo/14375429/ [https://perma.cc/EH5B-DYBN]. 
79. While Airbnb maintains that the majority of its hosts casually use the site, a 
substantial number of the listings posted on Airbnb are not from “regular people,” but from 
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A. Local Law 
Four limitations restrict the ability of local government to regulate 
business: (1) the state must implicitly or expressly delegate the power to
the municipality; (2) there “must be a rational connection between the
restriction and some legitimate end of government policy;” (3) the restriction 
must not violate constitutional due process; and (4) any distinctions drawn
between different types of business must be reasonable and not violate
equal protection.80  Under this framework, cities can regulate room-sharing
businesses, because regulation falls under the legitimate policy catchall of
promoting general welfare and protecting consumers.81  Several categories of
permissible city and municipal law impact room-sharing, including health
and safety, zoning, and tax regulations.
In cities, code enforcement agencies police the regulation of local health
and safety requirements.82  Common examples of code enforcement divisions
include building code inspectors, fire marshals, and health inspectors,
empowered by the municipality to inspect for violations and issue various 
sanctions. In New York City, for instance, the Environmental Control 
Board issues tickets for “non-criminal quality-of-life violations,” such as 
allowing rodents or pest infestations in a residence.83  At least one Airbnb 
host already contested a ticket after the Board issued violation notices for
hosts with multiple listings. The Shape of Airbnb’s Business, TOMSLEE.NET (May 26, 2014),
http://tomslee.net/2014/05/the-shape-of-airbnbs-business.html [https://perma.cc/MB85­
8U6F] (examining Airbnb’s listings and finding that Airbnb’s self-published figures are 
skewed to reflect the percentage of hosts who rent the residence they reside in, but that the 
percentage of listings shows a much higher proportion of multiple-listing owners than 
Airbnb admits).
80. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 591–92
(2d ed. 2001). States delegate much of their police powers to local government because
“many functions can best be provided at the community level, where the government is 
not a distant, dimly perceived entity, but is close to—and [should] be kept responsive to—
its constituents.” Id. at 1–2. 
81. See McClellan v. Kansas City, 379 S.W.2d 500, 504 (Mo. 1964) (recognizing 
the right of municipalities to create laws advancing consumer safety protection); REYNOLDS,
supra note 80, at 593. 
82. See, e.g., Wasted Water, LAS VEGAS VALLEY WATER DIST., https://www.lvvwd.
com/conservation/waste.html [https://perma.cc/BLD5-VZ5W] (last visited May 15, 2016) 
(explaining that like fire or food inspectors, the Las Vegas Water District, who inspect
reports of wasted water). 
83. Environmental Control Board Violations, NYC.GOV, http://www1.nyc.gov/nyc- 
resources/service/1614/environmental-control-board-violation-information [https://perma.cc/
Q2Z7-8B6L] (last visited May 15, 2016) (providing examples of common violations, 
including unleashed dogs, public indecency, and rollerblading or motorcycling in a
forbidden area). 
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insufficient fire safety and building exits and using a “permanent dwelling 
for non-permanent purposes.”84 
Zoning rules restrict the usage of land within city limits, usually for the 
purposes of managing and protecting resources and access to utilities.85 
For instance, the New York City Charter empowers the city’s zoning 
commission “to restrict the locations of trades and industries and location
of buildings designed for specific uses.”86  Although zoning is a function
of state legislative power, state legislatures often delegate zoning power
to municipal governments in light of the local nature of zoning rules.87 
Municipalities have wider discretion over zoning powers through home 
rule laws,88 as “[c]ontrol over, and planning of, the uses made of land 
within a community is one of the chief functions of local government.”89 
84. Ctr. for N.Y.C. Law, Fined $4,200 for Illegal Transient Use, 20 CITY L. 101 
(2014) (citing NYC v. ECC Realty LLC, ECB Appeal No. 1400480 (July 31, 2014)). The 
owners of the apartment complex had to pay $4,200 for the violations.  Id.
 85. ORSI, supra note 38, at 516. 
86. NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CHARTER § 200 (2004). 
87. PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 1 AM. LAW. ZONING § 2:1 (5th ed. 2015) [hereinafter AM.
LAW. ZONING].  Zoning laws are an exercise of legislative power, falling within state police
powers. Id.  Although states tend to delegate these powers to local governments, the state 
may explicitly reserve zoning powers to itself, either through legislation or through 
creating statewide planning agencies. Id. § 2:3.  In New York, for instance, the state 
legislature primarily delegates zoning power to municipalities through constitutional 
amendment.  PATRICIA E. SALKIN, 1 N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC. § 2:03 (4th ed. 2015)
[hereinafter N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC.]. 
88. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 76.  Since the late 19th century, many states
recognized the “home rule” doctrine, prioritizing local sovereignty over local matters.  Id.
The “home rule doctrine,” much like vertical federalism in the relationship between the 
states and the federal government, distinguishes between “matters of purely municipal or 
local import, and those of general, statewide concern,” with city law trumping state law
when the former are implicated. Id.  Home rule persists as a creature of statutory or 
constitutional provision rather than as an inherent right.  Id. at 84.  The existence of charter 
cities refines the home rule doctrine. Id.  The strongest form of city government is the 
incorporated city or “public corporation”; more than a mere subservient of state
government, the incorporated city exists solely to serve the independent needs of its 
citizens. Id. at 19–20.  States interpret the extent of a charter’s grant of power differently:
in Oregon, as in a majority of states, a municipal charter is a “grant of power to a locality,” 
meaning the municipality’s powers are only “expressed or implied in its charter.”  Id. at
157. Local law governs local matters and state law governs state matters.  Id.  However, 
in a minority of states, including California, the municipal charter is “a limitation on 
powers and not a grant,” so that a city has the power to regulate local matters, even when 
the power to regulate those matters is not granted in the city charter. Id. at 156–58.
 89. REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 409; see also AM. LAW. ZONING, supra note 87, at 
§ 2:4.  Generally, municipalities are more capable of policing room-sharing and ensuring
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Room-sharing may violate several types of zoning requirements, including
single-family use and exclusionary ordinances.90  For instance, a homeowner 
in a single-family use zone, by renting a room in her house to a guest, 
would violate the zoning requirement unless she vacates the house during 
that period.91  Regular use of a family residence for room-sharing seems 
in tension with “what the early zoners considered to be the ‘highest’ use
of land, the dwelling constructed and used as a residence for one family.”92 
In New York, local zoning ordinances mandate single-family residences
in some areas and forbid using the residences for “lodging.”93  In 2008, a
state court ruled that short-term rentals violate the zoning ordinance, 
determining that a “lodger,” in was “a[ny] person who contracts for less 
than a landlord/tenant relationship wherein unexclusive occupancy of real 
property is granted and the owner does not surrender dominion over the 
premises to the lodger.”94 While controversial, single-family use ordinances 
are a common limitation on the usage of private property in residential
95areas.
Some municipalities preserve a homeowner’s right to rent out rooms,
under special laws addressing tourist homes or “transient residences.”  These 
cities include Atlanta, Georgia96 and Tampa, Florida.97  In these places,
hosts comply with particular regulations than their state counterparts. REYNOLDS, supra
note 80, at 16–17.
 90. See Paul E. King, Exclusionary Zoning and Open Housing: A Brief Judicial 
History, 68 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 459, 459 (1978). 
91. See City of White Plains v. Ferraioli, 313 N.E.2d 756, 757 (N.Y. 1974). 
92. N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC., supra note 87, at § 7:22.  One Supreme Court
justice waxed sentimental in his support for single-family zoning, picturing: 
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted
are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs . . . .
The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy
places.  It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclusion, and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974).
93. But see City of Worcester v. Coll. Hill Properties, 987 N.E.2d 1236, 1246 
(Mass. 2013) (interpreting the Lodging House Act to apply to student apartments would 
lead to absurd results and suggesting a better way to protect inhabitants’ safety would be
to enforce applicable zoning ordinances and fire safety and sanitary codes). 
94. See People v. Hyland, No. BATO 61–08 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. Apr. 2, 2008), appeal
dismissed, No. 2008-943 S. CR. (App. Term Jan. 12, 2009), and leave to appeal denied, 
881 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2009). 
95. See King, supra note 90, at 459. 
96. “A building other than a hotel where lodging is provided and offered to the 
public for compensation for not more than twenty (20) individuals and open to transient 
guests.” ATLANTA, GA., ZONING MANUAL, art. III § 1 (1965). 
97. See TAMPA, FL., ZONING ORDINANCE § 39-8.1 (1966). 
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the law provides for accessory lodging uses, often by allowing “tourist
homes,” a predecessor to Airbnb-type rentals.98 
Accessory rentals are only legal, however, when a host is not in the
business of renting rooms.99 A small number of cases and statutes address
this distinction in the transient rental context, typically relying on case­
by-case determinations of whether a house is being rented principally as 
a profit-making enterprise.100  Statutes may alternatively require the court 
inquire into whether the use is customary in the area.101  In a Maryland 
case, the court determined the homeowners were not renting their house 
as an accessory use, explaining: 
In the case before us, we think it evident that the business tail is wagging the
residential dog. . . . There can be no real doubt that the [Defendants] are not 
renting the seven rooms as an incident of or as accessory to their use of the 
property as a home, but rather are occupying the property as a place for the
carrying on of the business of renting apartments and rooms.  The principal use 
of the building clearly would seem to be the renting of dwelling quarters to
others.102 
Other cases base the distinction on whether the owner of the home remains
there with the guests, unless the statute provides further clarification.103 
Alternatively, room-sharing may be likened to operating a bed-and­
breakfast, as contemplated by San Diego.104  Similarly, Boston authorities
 98. See, e.g., Richardson v. Passmore, 63 S.E.2d 392, 394 (Ga. 1951). 
99. See id. at 394. 
100. See, e.g., Richardson, 63 S.E.2d at 394; Keseling v. City of Baltimore, 151 A.2d
726, 729 (Md. 1959); NYC v. ECC Realty LLC, ECB Appeal No. 1400480 (July 31, 
2014); Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see
also 4 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW §
79:29 (rev. ed. 2003). 
101. See Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797, 800 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
102.  Keseling v. City of Baltimore, 151 A.2d 726, 729 (Md. 1959). 
103. See Reynolds v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 578 A.2d 629 (Pa. 1990) (holding bed­
and-breakfast was not clearly incidental or secondary to use of dwelling for dwelling 
purposes and was therefore not home occupation qualifying as special use in residential 
district); N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC., supra note 87, § 13:19. 
104. See supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text; see also Letter from Travis R.
Crane, Planning and Zoning Administrator to Ruffin Hall, City Manager (Jan. 9, 2015)
[hereinafter Crane Letter], http://www.wral.com/asset/news/local/2015/01/20/14370331/
AirbnbReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/8ZWV-8W5U]; Memorandum from William Christopher,
Jr., Commissioner of Inspections Services, to Senior Management and Staff of Boston 
(June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Christopher Memorandum], https://www.scribd.com/doc/
233075162/ISD-Short-Term-Dwelling-Unit-Rental-Memo [https://perma.cc/4C9Z-7F2Y] (stating
Airbnb and other room-sharing hosts are “subject to local licensure as bed and breakfast[s].”). 
 487










      
 
 




    
 
 
   
   
    
  
  
   
 
 
    
   







   
    
are “currently examining how these services fit within . . . existing zoning 
and permitting definitions,” and one state official opined that Airbnb falls 
under the category of “bed and breakfast” for the purpose of licensure
requirements.105  However, regulation as a bed and breakfast likely will
not exempt hosts from complying with hotel regulations.106 
Cases addressing room-sharing as operating a hotel, running a bed-and­
breakfast, or falling within a tourist exception all are similar: courts 
examine the nature of the use and whether it is accessory or primary to 
occupation.107  And despite differing local approaches and vocabulary, all
courts will disfavor hosts who violate residential covenants or whose 
activities are harming their neighborhoods.108  A California appellate court,
for instance, enforced a covenant against an offending homeowner despite 
strictly reading the covenants in favor of furthering “unencumbered use.”109 
The Court held “[evidence of operating a beauty salon] reasonably supports
an inference that the use complained of was detrimental to respondents in
appreciably detracting from the residential character of the neighborhood.”110 
Neighbors’ complaints about foot traffic, concerns about strangers residing, 
and damage or noise caused by guests would similarly factor against a
room-sharing host contending her rentals are “incidental use.”111 
Municipal tax laws—in addition to state laws—also apply to hosts, as 
state law or a home rule charter empowers local government to collect
funding for its functions.112  As the operator of a business, the host must 
pay local business tax, sales tax, and, possibly, special hotel taxes.113 
105.  Christopher Memorandum, supra note 104. 
106. See 83 AM. JUR. 2D ZONING AND PLANNING § 162 (2013) (citing Town of 
Sullivan Island v. Bynum, 413 S.E.2d 325, 328 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam) (“A 
home for overnight guests, commonly called a ‘bed and breakfast,’ is not clearly incidental
and secondary to the residential use of property and therefore does not constitute a home 
occupation.”). At least one state court found that a bed-and-breakfast must still comply
with safety regulations (such as fire safety requirements), even if operated in a single 
family dwelling.  See Orth v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 588 A.2d 113, 114–16 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991).
107. See e.g., Town of Milford v. Bottazzi, 433 A.2d 1269, 1270 (N.H. 1981);
Hughes v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Waterville, 631 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1011 (Sup. Ct. 1995); 
83 AM. JUR. 2D ZONING AND PLANNING § 176 (2013). 
108. See Mark S. Dennison, Annotation, Construction and Application of “Residential
Purposes Only” or Similar Covenant Restriction to Incidental Use of Dwelling for 
Business, Professional, or Other Purposes, 1 A.L.R.6th 135, 152–55 (2005). But see
Richey v. Olson, 709 P.2d 963, 964 (Colo. App. 1985) (allowing bed-and-breakfast despite 
restrictive residential covenant). 
sales tax; for example, New York requires hotel occupancy purveyors to pay sales tax
109. 
110. 
 Biagini v. Hyde, 83 Cal. Rptr. 875, 877 (Ct. App. 1970). 
Id. at 877. 
111. See id. at 876–77. 
112. 
113. 
See REYNOLDS, supra note 80, at 334–35. 
ORSI, supra note 38, at 527.  Some states may require hosts to collect and remit 
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Airbnb recently agreed to collect and remit these taxes in some cities, but
in most jurisdictions, hosts still bear the burden of compliance, rather than 
the sharing platform facilitating the arrangement.114 
B. State Law 
While room-sharing is most likely to be regulated at the municipal level, 
state law can also affect short-term rentals.  For instance, if a short-term
rental operates as an illegal hotel, hosts potentially are subject to duties 
set at the state level.115  Treatment as a hotelier places a higher burden of 
compliance on hosts, imposing duties such as receiving guests, not
discriminating against them, and protecting them from harm.116  Some  
state statutes, for instance, codify the common law duty to receive guests
when there is no just cause for turning them away.117 Violation of New
York’s duty to receive statute is a misdemeanor, for which an innkeeper
regardless of the amount of sales made.  N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN., BULLETIN
NO. TB-ST-175, DO I NEED TO REGISTER FOR SALES TAX? (Mar. 26, 2010), https:// 
www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/tg_bulletins/sales/b15_175s.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNK8-PGVG].
114. See Pitt Cty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2009) (“A business 
that arranges for the rental of hotel rooms over the internet, but that does not physically
provide the rooms, is not a business that is of a similar type to a hotel, motel, or tourist 
home or camp.”).
115. See 43A C.J.S. Inns, Hotels, and Eating Places § 11 (2014).  However,
depending on the nature of the agreement between a guest and a host, the relationship 
could foreseeably also be that of a landlord/tenant. Id. at 556–58. Primarily, the difference 
rests on guests having a license to share the space of another, while tenants have a 
possessory interest in the property. See  SHERRY, supra note 55, at 143 (“The question 
whether a person receiving accommodations at an inn is a guest or a lodger, boarder, or
tenant, is one of fact.” (citing Hancock v. Rand, 94 N.Y. 1, 7–8 (1883)); Comment, Tenant, 
Lodger, and Guest: Questionable Categories for Modern Rental Occupants, 64 YALE L.J.
391, 392–93 (1955). 
116. States may construe this duty narrowly, for instance only where an innkeeper-
guest relationship exists. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 634 (D. Del. 
2007) (refusing to extend a duty to receive to internet search engines). 
117. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 365 (West 2010) (“Every person . . . carrying on
business as an innkeeper . . . who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to receive and
entertain any guest . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1501 (West
2011) (stating an exception to the duty to receive for customers who would be offensive 
to the majority of the proprietor’s guests); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-21-3 (2011) (“An 
innkeeper who advertises himself as such is bound to receive as guests, so far as he can
accommodate them, all persons of good character who desire accommodation and who are 
willing to comply with his rules.”); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-e (McKinney 1965) (“A 
person, who . . . carries on business as innkeeper . . . and refuses, without just cause or
excuse, to receive and entertain any guest . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
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may be held civilly liable.118 In California, where an offending innkeeper 
faces both civil and criminal liability for failing to receive a guest, state 
court interpretations of “inn” or “hotel” are expansive enough to include 
a room-sharing host.119  An inn or hotel is “a house which is held out to
the public as a place where all transient persons who come will be received 
and entertained as guests for compensation.”120  Following the logic of one 
California case, even an atypical establishment qualifies as an inn or hotel: 
An hotel is [nonetheless] one because in some respects it may be conducted
differently or have more attractions than other public hotels, so long as it is held
out to the public as a place for the entertainment of all transient persons who may 
have occasion to patronize it.121 
This definition is broad, encompassing a homeowner or apartment tenant
advertising her personal residence for paying guests. 
The majority of states also have civil rights laws applicable to hotels 
and other places of public accommodation.122  In New York, for instance, 
a civil rights law protects people from discrimination in any “place of
public accommodation, resort or amusement” on the basis of “race, creed,
color, or national origin.”123 This law applies to any “hotel,” defined as:
A house where all who conduct themselves properly, and who are able and ready
to pay for their entertainment, are received, if there is accommodation for
them, and who, without any stipulated engagement as to the duration of their stay, 
or as to the rate of compensation, are, while there, supplied at a reasonable charge
with meals, their lodgings, and such services and attention as are necessarily
incident to the use of the house as a temporary home.124 
Subsequent case law suggests an even broader interpretation of “hotel” 
as a word that should “be construed according to its common acceptance . . . . 
designat[ing] what is ordinarily and popularly known as an inn or tavern, 
or place for the entertainment of travelers, and where all their wants can
 118. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40-e.
119. See PENAL § 365 (“Every person . . . carrying on business as an innkeeper . . . 
who refuses, without just cause or excuse, to receive and entertain any guest, or to receive 
and carry any passenger, is guilty of a misdemeanor.”); Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian
Hotels, Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 599, 604–05 (Ct. App. 1977) abrogated on other grounds by
Koire v. Metro Car Wash, 707 P.2d 195 (Cal. 1985). 
120.  Fay v. Pac. Imp. Co., 26 P. 1099, 1100 (Cal. 1891) aff’d, 28 P. 943 (1892).
 121. Id. 
122. SHERRY, supra note 55, at 49. 
123. Id. (quoting N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney 2009)).  Violation of the 
New York Civil Rights Law results in civil liability as well as a misdemeanor conviction
and fine.  See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 40 (McKinney 2009). 
124. Alsberg v. Lucerne Hotel Co., 92 N.Y.S. 851, 852 (1905) (quoting Cromwell 
v. Stevens, 3 Abb. Pr. (n.s.) 26 (1867)). 
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be supplied.”125  If a user of a room-sharing platform succeeds in proving 
a violation of New York civil rights law, then the broad definition of hotel 
would likely create liability for the host under state law.126 
Once the parties establish a host–guest relationship, many courts presume 
duties on the part of the host to care for the guest.127  The relationship
exists even in the absence of a formal contract, obligating the host to various 
responsibilities.128  Hosts, when acting as innkeepers, respect the guest’s
right to exclusive use and possession of his room, and also furnish 
accommodations and safeguard their guests from reasonable harm.129 
The innkeeper’s common law duty to safeguard applies to guests, as 
well as their belongings.  It includes the obligation to protect guests from 
injury by third persons when such is within the innkeeper’s power.130 
Proprietors of public places of business are not generally responsible for
the safety of patrons against injuries caused by people for whose actions 
the proprietors are not responsible.131 Nevertheless, courts often find
negligence on the part of the innkeeper who knows the perpetrator to be 
125. Dixon v. Robbins, 158 N.E. 63, 63 (N.Y. 1927) (noting various definitions of
both “inn” and “hotel” include a variety of houses where, as a matter of business, travelers 
are entertained and provided lodging.”). 
126. See Lieber, supra note 3.  In fact, Airbnb specifically warns hosts that “[they]
may also be subject to . . . local laws that prohibit discrimination. ADA and FHA 
Compliance, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/898 [https://perma.cc/AA94­
MQ85] (last visited May 15, 2016).  Many states and local communities have passed anti-
discrimination ordinances and statutes, and renters’ rights vary. . . . [Hosts] should be familiar 
with the [applicable] laws.” Id.
 127. See SHERRY, supra note 55, at 114.  Registration, including registration in advance 
that would occur using a room-sharing platform, customarily creates this relationship. See 
id. at 131–34. 
128. See Holland v. Pack, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 151 (1823) (responsibility for a guest’s 
stolen horse); see also State v. Anonymous (1977–7), 379 A.2d 1 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)
(noting the length of stay, existence of a special contract, host’s ownership of another
home, and host’s presence as “material circumstances in determining whether . . . a guest
or a lodger.”). Airbnb creates the host-guest relationship through contract. See Terms of
Service, supra note 2.
 129. See SHERRY, supra note 55, at 159, 162, 179.  The duty to safeguard guests from 
harm includes providing safe premises, including ceilings, stairways, floors, doors, elevators,
bathroom, and room furnishings and ensuring the premises are free of vermin.  Id. at 179– 
204.  However, the hotel proprietor is not strictly liable under the doctrine of products 
liability “for injuries to hotel guests caused by defects in the premises.”  Peterson v.
Superior Court, 899 P.2d 905, 907 (Cal. 1995). 
130. See SHERRY, supra note 55, at 219–48. 
131. See Hibbs v. Brown Hotel Co., 302 S.W.2d 127 (Ky. 1957). 
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violent or likely to assault a guest.132  In addition to safeguarding guests, 
innkeepers have a duty to safeguard their belongings, although many 
states enacted legislation to protect innkeepers from strict liability for the 
loss or destruction of goods.133  In California, for instance, innkeepers, hotel
keepers, and others operating “a licensed hotel” must keep a fireproof safe
for storing valuables, in order to limit liability for lost items.134 
C. Private Law 
Both homeowners and tenants offer strangers the use of their residences
on room-sharing platforms.135  For tenants, lease agreements confine their 
ability to advertise for guests even when complying with state or local
laws.136  These tenants may face eviction for renting out their apartments
on room-sharing platforms.137  For homeowners, private covenants may 
similarly restrict land use, although some courts have been disinclined to
enforce private covenants against short-term renters.138  Courts’ reluctance to
enforce these private covenants reflects a disfavor toward restricting the
use of land.139 Whether renting their own or others’ residences, hosts must
 132. See  SHERRY, supra note 55, at 220–21.  For instance, courts have delineated
between injuries caused by an “enthusiastic” jitterbugging couple (defendant hotel not 
negligent) and a trigger-happy porter (defendant hotelier negligent).  See Hibbs, 302 
S.W.2d at 128; Clancy v. Barker, 103 N.W. 446, 447 (Neb. 1905). 
133. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 200 (McKinney 2012).
134. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1860 (West 2010). 
135. See Who Can Host on AirBNB?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/18
[https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/18] (assuring availability of almost any type of
residence, including “airbeds in apartments, entire houses, rooms in bed-and-breakfasts, 
hotel rooms, tree houses in the woods, boats on the water, or enchanted castles”) (last
visited May 21, 2016). 
136. See Responsible Hosting, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/responsible-hosting 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2014). 
137. See id. New York City resident Chris Dannen, for instance, spent a “heady
year” renting his Brooklyn apartment out to tourists, grossing over $20,000 in nine months. 
Chris Dannen, How Airbnb Earned Me $20,000 and a Restraining Order from My 
Landlord, FAST COMPANY (June 6, 2012, 12:25 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/
1839465/how-airbnb-earned-me-20000-and-restraining-order-my-landlord [https://perma.
cc/P34H-XCFM].  His landlord served him with a restraining order, based on his Airbnb
rentals violating provisions of his lease—specifically, failing to obtain his roommates’
permission before listing. Id. Dannen was ultimately evicted for his activities.  Chris 
Dannen, My Airbnb Biz Got Me Evicted, Here’s What I Learned, FAST COMPANY (June
19, 2012, 12:15 AM), http://www.fastcompany.com/1840715/my-airbnb-biz-got-me-evicted­
heres-what-i-learned [https://perma.cc/RVB3-K29H].
138. See Scott v. Walker, 645 S.E.2d 278, 283 (Va. 2007) (deciding interests in favor 
of free use of property and against restrictions tipped the scales toward allowing short term
rentals).
139. See, e.g., Dunn v. Aamodt, 695 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2012); Slaby v.
Mountain River Estates Residential Ass’n, 100 So. 3d 569, 582 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012), 
cert. denied (Aug. 10, 2012); Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 261, 266 (Md. 2006); Mullin
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be sure to research both their local public laws and the terms of their
contracts or deeds.
IV. THREE CASE STUDIES
New York City, San Francisco, and Portland, Oregon provide useful
case studies of the various responses to room-sharing’s boom in American
cities. The following sections discuss the progress of Airbnb’s struggle 
to avoid regulation in each of the three cities, varying from hostile authorities 
in New York City to cooperation between city and corporate government 
in Portland and San Francisco. 
A. New York 
Airbnb’s largest market is New York City, where it has met vocal
opposition.  The state attorney general publicly decries Airbnb’s practices 
as a threat to New York communities’ “safety, affordability, and residential
character.”140  The attorney general’s office claims the majority of Airbnb 
hosts flout both state and local law.141  Cooperation with the law is challenging
for residential users, and New York City ordinances and New York state
laws aptly illustrate the inaccessibility of laws governing rentals to all but 
the most sophisticated tenants.142  A plethora of dwelling laws apply to tenants,
including state laws such as the Multiple Dwelling Law, the Multiple 
Residence Law, and provisions of the New York City Administrative 
v. Silvercreek Condo. Owner’s Ass’n, 195 S.W.3d 484, 490 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006); Mason 
Family Trust v. DeVaney, 207 P.3d 1176, 1178 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009); Scott, 645 S.E.2d 
at 283; Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmtys. Ass’n, 327 P.3d 614, 620 (Wa. 2014). 
140.  Research Dep’t and Internet Bureau, supra note 9, at 2.
 141. See id.; see also Jason Clampet, Airbnb in NYC: The Real Numbers Behind the 
Sharing Story, SKIFT (Feb. 13, 2014, 9:00 AM), http://skift.com/2014/02/13/airbnb-in­
nyc-the-real-numbers-behind-the-sharing-story/ [https://perma.cc/AAC2-KWZL] (finding 
in a third-party investigation that two thirds of the listings with user reviews were for the
“entire home/apartment” room type); discussion supra note 79. 
142. See Terms of Service, supra note 2. Airbnb places the burden of learning about 
and complying with local law on hosts, disclaiming any liability for illegality of room-
sharing within a jurisdiction. See id. The website provides minimal guidance as to complying 
with these rules. See What Legal and Regulatory Issues Should I Consider Before Hosting 
on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/376/what-legal-and-regulatory­
issues-should-i-consider-before-hosting-on-airbnb [https://perma.cc/N893-SQW6] (last
visited May 16, 2016). 
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Code.143 Room-sharing hosts also face liability under local tax laws— 
although it is unclear whether some or all room-sharing hosts qualify as 
“hotel operators.”144 
While Warren escaped paying fines on his rental,145 other cases
prosecuted by New York courts make it likely the new amendments to the 
Multiple Dwelling Law will be applied to criminalize room-sharing.146  In
June 2014, for example, a city housing court found that a tenant violated 
the law by using Airbnb to rent out her apartment.147  Before that, another
case granted a preliminary injunction against the operators of a small
room-sharing platform, preventing them from advertising, contracting for, 
or allowing transient occupancy of the dwelling.148  In a decision with 
negative implications for all room-sharing platforms, the court stated the
defendants created a public nuisance by promoting the illegal use of non­
143. See generally N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW (McKinney 2012); N.Y. MULT. RESID.
LAW (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 2015) (creating limitations on businesses operating within 
residential areas).  Under the Multiple Dwelling Law, as amended in 2010, one cannot rent
out an apartment in a “Class A” multiple dwelling for less than thirty days, unless a
permanent resident is present during the rental period.  N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 4
(McKinney 2012).  A “multiple dwelling” is a dwelling occupied by three or more families
living independently. Id.  The purpose of this prohibition is to protect guests, ensure the 
proper fire and safety codes, and protect permanent residents who “must endure the 
inconvenience of hotel occupancy in their buildings.” See Senate Bill S6873B, N.Y. State 
Senate (2010), https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2009/s6873/amendment/b [https:// 
perma.cc/7ADZ-HXQ8] (scroll down to “S6873B (Active)—Bill Texts;” then select
“View Sponsor Memo”).  It was also designed to preserve the supply of affordable
permanent housing. Id.
144. New York City levies a hotel room occupancy tax, which may or may not apply
to hosts.  N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 11-2502.  Airbnb has to-date been unsuccessful 
in its appeal to the City to change the law to allow Airbnb to collect and remit tax on behalf 
of hosts, as many other cities allow.  Craig Karmin, Airbnb to New York’s Mayor: Tax Our 
Hosts, Fund Pet Programs, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 27, 2014, 10:31 PM), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303779504579465532885246114.
145. See Lieber, supra note 2. 
146. See Subletting Your Apartment, METRO. COUNCIL ON HOUS., http://metcouncilon 
housing.org/help_and_answers/subletting [https://perma.cc/2UKB-Z3QD] (last visited May
16, 2016) (“It is not legal to charge rent to anyone who stays for a period of fewer than 30 
days [in New York City].”). 
147. Natalie Rodriguez, NYC Housing Court Ties Landlords’ Hands in Airbnb Fight, 
LAW360 (June 18, 2014, 8:30 PM), http://www.kelaw.com/files/20140625111556-Article%
20-%20NYC%20Housing%20Court%20Ties%20Landlords.pdf [https://perma.cc/W3XA­
G8ST]. The court did not, however, enforce the tenant’s eviction, as she “cured” her
violation by ceasing the illegal activity. Id.
148. City of New York v. Smart Apartments LLC, 959 N.Y.S.2d 890 (Sup. Ct. 2013) 
(claiming violations of state multiple dwelling law as well as city housing maintenance 
and building codes).  Interestingly, one of defendants’ few arguments warranting judicial
consideration in this case was that their small room-sharing platform (smartapartments.
com) was the target of city enforcement rather than Airbnb, because New York City Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg was part of a venture fund with $100 million invested in Airbnb. Id.
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transient apartments because the apartments did not meet health and safety
codes.149  The aftermath of these cases indicates that Airbnb hosts risk
criminal charges for their illegal room-sharing, contingent on enforcement
by the city. 
Even without a violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law, short-term
rentals may break city law.  For instance, New York City Administrative
Code § 28-118.3.2 “prohibits changes to the use, occupancy, or egress of
a building.”150 Absent express authorization of the building’s occupancy 
certificate, short-term rentals of non-Class A residences violate this
ordinance.151  If a host wishes to apply to the City to room-share as an 
“accessory use,” she must comply with New York City Zoning Resolution 
Section 12, which explains that an accessory use fits the following criteria:
(1) is clearly incidental to or secondary to the residential use of a dwelling unit or
rooming unit; 
(2) is carried on within a dwelling unit, rooming unit, or accessory building by
one or more occupants of such dwelling unit or rooming unit . . . and 
(3) occupies not more than 25% of the total floor area of such dwelling unit or
rooming unit and in no event more than 500 feet of the floor area.152 
If the use is not “clearly incidental” or even occupies too much space, it is a
change to the building’s primary use. 
Cases interpreting this section have given deference to the city’s judgment
of what uses are accessory.  The superior court generally noted that “courts 
are not sympathetic toward property owners who employ this means of 
changing a nonconforming use.”153  New York State courts also interpreted 
similar provisions in other municipalities against incidental residential 
usage.154  Two of these cases held that using a dwelling as a boardinghouse 
went beyond an incidental use, emphasizing the fact that the boarders were
strangers rather than family members of the hosts.155  For New Yorkers, the
city’s aggressive stance toward illegal rentals means hosts face a likelihood 









 N.Y.C., N.Y., ZONING RESOLUTION § 12-10 (emphasis omitted).
N.Y. ZONING LAW & PRAC, supra note 87, § 10:27. 
See Mayer v. Livingston, 172 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Kiernan v. Snowden,
123 N.Y.S.2d 895 (Sup. Ct. 1953). 
155. See Mayer, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 46–47; Kiernan, 123 N.Y.S.2d at 899, 901.
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B. San Francisco 
The birthplace of Airbnb, San Francisco, houses thousands of listings 
and has been somewhat more open to room-sharing than New York City.156 
Until recently, room-sharing was mostly illegal, due to a San Francisco 
city ordinance penalizing the offering of a residential unit for tourist or 
transient use for less than thirty days at a time.157  San Francisco room-
sharing hosts also ran afoul of Planning Code ordinances, designating 
short-term rentals as illegal residential conversions to hotels.158 
However, in early September 2014, a San Francisco supervisor introduced 
legislation allowing city residents to rent out their primary residences for
up to three months every year, so long as they complied with tax and rent
control laws.159  His proposal required registration and rental only of a
primary residence  to ensure enforcement through increased penalties for
reoffenders, forbade rent-controlled units from listing, and prevented units
with outstanding building, electrical, plumbing, mechanical, fire, health, 
housing, or planning code violations from listing.160  The City approved
the proposal in October and it took effect in early 2015 when the Planning
Department required prospective hosts to show up in-person to register.161 
Nearly a year later, however, the law faces challenges as San Franciscans
vote on a measure, vehemently opposed by Airbnb, that would limit short-
term rentals to seventy-five days per year and allow lawsuits against hosts 
and Airbnb for violations.162
 156. San Francisco Listings, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/s/San-FranciscoCA 
[https://perma.cc/LA36-5CF2] (last visited May 16, 2016). 
157. 	S.F. ADMIN. CODE §41.A5 (2016). 
It shall be unlawful for . . . any owner to offer an apartment residential unit for 
rent for tourist or transient use . . . any owner to offer a residential unit for rent 
to a business entity that will allow the use of a residential unit for tourist or
transient use, or . . . any business entity to allow the use of a residential unit for 
tourist or transient use.
Id.
 158. See S.F. PLANNING CODE §§ 102, 209.2(d), 317 (2016); S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 41
(2016).




 161. Julie Bort, San Francisco Makes Airbnb Legal at Last, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 10,
2014, 12:41 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-makes-airbnb-legal-at­
last-2014-10 [https://perma.cc/E32K-U7CH]; Carol Said, Airbnb Hosts Must Appear in
Person to Comply with New SF Law, S.F. GATE (Jan. 19, 2015, 9:32 PM), http://
www.sfgate.com/business/article/Airbnb-hosts-must-appear-in-person-to-comply-with­
6025767.php [https://perma.cc/5YWJ-MYTL].
162. Janie Har, Airbnb Battles Hostile Ballot Measure in San Francisco, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (Oct. 25, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/aebf97d3eb35488d 
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The current law bans renting entire houses and apartments when a
resident is not present during the rental period, so it will not affect Airbnb 
users hosting others in part of their residences.163  However, for competitors 
such as VRBO (Vacation Rentals by Owner) and HomeAway, which list 
entire residences, the new law “hobbles” their businesses in San Francisco.164 
The city defended this policy, explaining that the law’s exception only 
applies to permanent San Francisco residents sharing their homes because it
is “vital . . . to prevent much-needed permanent housing from being diverted 
into lucrative short-term rentals.”165 
The new law’s disparate treatment is consistent with city law, which 
differentiates between primary and accessory use of residences as rentals. 
San Francisco’s Planning Code only permits accessory usages using less 
than a quarter of residential floor space and not involving a commercial
usage unless permitted under another section.166  The rule requires a 
conditional use permit for short-term vacation rental property providing 
accommodation for transient overnight guests.167 
An ongoing class action lawsuit against Airbnb in the superior court
illustrates the need for city attention on illegal room-sharing.168  Plaintiffs
filed the suit as representatives of “tenants who lived in a residential unit 
while other units within the building were rented through Airbnb’s
platform,” seeking class certification in order to litigate their claims of 
violations of the San Francisco city code as well as unfair competition.169 
Their complaint alleges that Airbnb knowingly encourages illegal room
rentals, violating San Francisco’s rules concerning single-room occupancy
8157a9f6827bba45/airbnb-battles-hostile-ballot-measure-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/
6JWS-3LHY]. 
163. See Carol Said, Airbnb Law Would Make Business Harder for Airbnb’s Chief 
Rival, S.F. GATE (Oct. 10, 2014, 8:42 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Airbnb- 
law-would-make-business-harder-for-5812918.php [https://perma.cc/58WY-67ZN]. 
164. Id.  Both VRBO and Homeaway offer entire houses for rent, rather than
individual rooms or space within a house or apartment. See Michelle Higgins, Surfing for
a Vacation Rental, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at TR3, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/ 
22/travel/vacation-rental-sites.html. 
165. Id.
 166. S.F. PLANNING CODE § 204.2 (2016). 
167. S.F. PLANNING CODE § 209.2(d) (2016). 
168. Class Calls AirBnB Illegal in San Francisco, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Sept. 















   
   
 
    
     
 
   









    
 
   
 





units.170  The plaintiffs accuse Airbnb of contributing to the housing shortage 
in San Francisco and creating foot traffic and security issues for neighbors 
of short term rentals.171  While many San Franciscans turn to room-sharing 
to afford the high cost of living in the Bay Area, others such as the named
plaintiffs in Gamache worry that Airbnb only contributes to the problem. 
C. Portland
Airbnb’s most successful partnership with local government is in
Portland, Oregon, where short-term rentals became legal within the last 
two years.172  On July 30, 2014, the City Council revamped Portland’s Zoning 
Code, allowing short-term rentals of single family homes and accessory
dwelling units.173  Now, prospective hosts pay an initial fee of $178.08 for
a “Type-A Accessory Short Term Rental Permit,” allowing short-term rentals, 
although not of apartments or condominiums.174  Noting that the definition
of “short term rental” varies “from state to state and city to city,” the city
emphasizes that renting must be an accessory use of the building.175 Thus,
Portland allows only short-term rentals where the owner remains a long 
170. Joshua Sabatini, Lawsuit Alleges Tenderloin Single Room Occupancy Hotel
Rooms Rented Through Airbnb, EXAMINER (Sept. 8, 2014), http://archives.sfexaminer.com/ 
sanfrancisco/lawsuit-alleges-tenderloin-single-room-occupancy-hotel-rooms-rented­
through-airbnb/Content?oid=2893684 [https://perma.cc/CHP3-V8J2].
171. Complaint at 3, Gamache v. Airbnb, No. CGC-14-541477 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 
3, 2014). 
172. Previously, the Oregon Supreme Court had ruled in favor of accessory bed-and­
breakfast rentals, although at least one older case suggested state courts strictly interpreted 
single family zoning requirements against short term bed-and-breakfast rentals. Cf. 
Yogman v. Parrott, 937 P.2d 1019 (Or. 1997); Bruni v. Thacker 853 P.2d 307 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1993).
173. City of Portland Implements New Accessory Short-Term Rental Regulations, 
BUREAU OF DEV. SERVS. (Sept. 2, 2014), http://us1.campaign-archive1.com/?u=67b8e15a1
0439671ba1512b85&id=0c6d341f2e&e=23685c738d [https://perma.cc/78WH-N7NG].
Changes to the Zoning Code indicate the city’s desire to allow efficient use of residential
housing, which “keeps [it] primarily in residential use, and without detracting from 
neighborhood character . . . [and] provide[s] an alternative form of lodging for visitors 
who prefer a residential setting.” PORTLAND, OR. PLANNING & ZONING CODE, ch. 33-207
(1991), http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=28197&a=501886 [https://perma. 
cc/U5EK-7HMR].  The law also provides that, for a Type A permit, the host must reside 
in the unit at least 270 days per year.  Id. 
174. Frequently Asked Questions, DEV. SERVS., https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bds/
66835 [https://perma.cc/3ZMT-STTT] (last visited May 21, 2016).  However, renters of
dwellings other than apartments and condominiums may obtain a license with the
permission of their landlords. Id. 
175. Accessory Short-Term Rental Permits, DEV. SERVS., https://www.portlandoregon. 
gov/bds/65603 [https://perma.cc/N6P3-AFQD] (last visited May 21, 2016) (explaining 
that the overall purpose of the residence must still be long term occupancy for a Portlander). 
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term occupant and only rents a part of her home.176  Portland is further
considering an ordinance that would fine non-compliant hosts $500 per 
violation.177 
Prospective hosts must file for a permit, notify neighbors about their 
intention to rent their residence, obtain a business license, and file for
exemption from payment related to the business’s proceeds annually.178 
After receiving permits, hosts must “prominently” display them in the 
rental unit and continue to comply with additional duties to keep their
licenses.179  They must keep log books, collect and remit occupancy taxes
to the city, and renew the permit every two years.180  Although not a statutory 
duty, Portland’s explanation of the host’s role states that a host must “manage 
[her] accessory short-term rental so that guests will be respectful of the 
neighborhood in which [she] live[s] and be courteous to [her] neighbors.”181 
By legalizing short-term rentals, Portland took the lead among 
municipalities in addressing the inevitability of residents using room-
sharing platforms as a source of income.182 The regulation combats health 
and safety concerns by creating inspection requirements, ensuring that 
rentals meet basic standards.183  In addition, hosts must make an effort to 
keep permits current by complying with Portland’s standards and must 
176. Id.
 177. Aaron Mesh, Lobbying Group Including Airbnb Pushes Back on Portland’s 
Plan to Toughen Short-Term Rental Rules, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Dec. 17. 2014), http:// 
www.wweek.com/portland/blog-32595-lobbying_group_including_airbnb_pushes_back_on_
portlands_plan_to_toughen_short_term_rental_rules.html [https://perma.cc/79T3-DL8J].
178. How Do I Apply for a Type A Accessory Short-Term Rental Permit – 1&2
Dwelling Structure, DEV. SERVS., https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bds/article/518135 
[https://perma.cc/85XH-GEZB] (last visited May 21, 2016). 
179. What Happens After My Permit Application Is Approved?—1&2 Dwelling 
Structure, DEV. SERVS., https://www.portlandoregon.gov/bds/article/518459 [https://perma. 
cc/YEJ9-VC7E] (last visited May 21, 2016).  Hosts must also include their licensing in
advertisements.  Id. 
180. Id.  The log-books requirement is analogous to hotel law provisions.  See e.g.
L.A., CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 41.49 (2008). 
181. Id.  Such provisions help to allay the concerns of neighbors that short-term 
occupants will be noisy, destructive, and disruptive. See supra note 111 and accompanying 
text.
 182. See Jessica Plautz, Portland Could Soon Be the Most Airbnb-Friendly City in 
the U.S., MASHABLE (July 23, 2014), http://mashable.com/2014/07/23/portland-airbnb/ 
[https://perma.cc/Q5PP-ZYRC].
183. City of Portland Implements New Accessory Short-Term Rental Regulations,
supra note 173. 
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pay fines if they fail to do so.184  Despite Portland’s attempt to legalize
room-sharing, the city has received only a few permit applications so 
far—perhaps indicating that the bulk of room-sharing hosts will continue 
to subvert the law.185 
V. SUGGESTED APPROACH TO REGULATING ROOM-SHARING
Regulation is a necessity in the room-sharing industry.186  State and 
local governments must weigh the interests of various stakeholders— 
hosts, guests, and others in communities who do not participate in the sharing 
economy, but whose lives are nevertheless affected by increased traffic,
noise, and presence of strangers.187  Policymakers could choose to ban 
short-term rentals entirely, but this Comment proposes that taxation and 
local regulation can best minimize any dangers caused by room-sharing, 
while helping residents in expensive urban areas continue to afford their
homes. 
The first step toward regulation would be to identify hosts by requiring 
self-disclosure and verifying information through room-sharing platforms.
Disclosure requirements have been criticized in some markets, but here, 
little more than biographical details would be necessary.188  Although 
schemes such as San Francisco’s are in their infancy, it does not seem 
farfetched to expect information disclosure by sites such as Airbnb.189 
After all, Airbnb and every other sharing site are essentially just depositories
of information for hosts and guests to peruse.190  This nature of platforms
 184. See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text. 
185. Elliot Njus, Portlanders Aren’t Rushing to Legitimize Their Airbnb Short-Term 
Rentals, OREGONIAN (Sept. 3, 2014, 9:37 AM), http://www.oregonlive.com/front-porch/ 
index.ssf/2014/09/no_rush_to_legalize_airbnb-sty.html [https://perma.cc/Q3W2-U5NM].
Airbnb continues to resist efforts in Portland to force disclosure of hosts’ names, decrying 
the “unnecessary burden” of compliance.  Steve Law, Airbnb Resists City Efforts to 
Restrict Hosts Without Permits, PORTLAND TRIB. (Dec. 23, 2014, 7:00 PM) http:// 
portlandtribune.com/pt/9-news/244745-112103-airbnb-resists-city-efforts-to-restrict-hosts­
without-permits [https://perma.cc/DL57-ZTBH]. 
186. New regulation will clarify the existing law, a source of confusion to both
regulators and room sharers. See generally Crane Letter, supra note 104. 
187. See Ngai Pindell, Home Sweet Home? The Efficacy of Rental Restrictions to 
Promote Neighborhood Stability, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 41, 54 (2009), for an
examination of the effects of short-term rental activity on neighbors. 
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016) (prohibiting fraud or deceit in the purchase
or sale of any security); discussion infra notes 202–03 and accompanying text. 
189. See Douglas MacMillan, San Francisco Passes “Airbnb Law” to Legalize
Short-Term Rentals, WALL STREET J. BLOGS (Oct. 8, 2014, 1:32 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/digits/2014/10/08/san-francisco-passes-airbnb-law-to-legalize-short-term-rentals/. 
190. See, e.g., About Us, supra note 2; HOMEAWAY, http://www.homeaway.com/ 
[https://perma.cc/G2CP-6XGH] (last visited May 21, 2016); VRBO, http://www.vrbo.com/
[https://perma.cc/692F-TVJ9] (last visited May 21, 2016). 
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makes room-sharing disclosure easy.  Data about state residency, location, 
and length of rentals is easily calculable and already available to the 
sharing platform. 
Municipalities can require room-sharing platforms such as Airbnb to 
release lists of all available rooms within the city limits, either to verify
self-reporting or to avoid relying on hosts to self-report.  Statutory duties 
could be imposed, making room-sharing platforms liable if they do not
comply with disclosure requirements.191  By requiring disclosure of hosts’ 
listings, identities, and facts such as the income and number of days residents
rent their dwellings, local government can more easily monitor violations 
of the law. Already, Portland—a city that took the lead in adapting its
regulations to be friendlier to room-sharing—is implementing disclosure 
requirements.192 
After enacting regulations mandating disclosure of hosts’ names, addresses,
and other information about their short-term rentals, local governments
should study the impact of short-term rentals on their communities and
decide how to classify short-term rentals and whether to enact additional
restrictions. As discussed, local regulations typically already include
provisions for short-term rental, which may be supplemented or replaced
with rules tailored to Airbnb-type activity.193  “Accessory use” statutory 
amendments, for example, could expressly allow short-term rentals.
Municipalities have already begun adapting new local regulations to 
allow short-term rentals, but with various idiosyncrasies adapting short-
term rentals to local preferences.  For example, San Francisco’s law,
reflecting the chronic scarcity of local housing, requires a permanent 
resident’s presence in each residence during the rental period.194  In San
Luis Obispo County, California, short-term rentals—those for less than 
191. See, e.g., Har, supra note 162. Some people may not use Airbnb to list their
residence in hopes of avoiding regulatory compliance, but these individuals would represent 
just a few of the most flagrant offenders. Further, since Airbnb and a handful of other
sharing platforms dominate the room-sharing industry, the freedom from regulation costs 
would be offset by reduced ability to advertise for guests.
192. See Steve Law, Portland to Crack Down on Airbnb Hosts Who Fail to Get
Permits, PORTLAND TRIB. (Jan. 21, 2015, 1:05 PM), http://portlandtribune.com/pt/9­
news/247793-116145-portland-to-crack-down-on-airbnb-hosts-who-fail-to-get-permits- 
[https://perma.cc/84AD-5SP7]. In January, 2015, the Portland City Council approved 
giving the Portland Revenue Bureau the power to demand room-sharing brokers to provide 
hosts’ names and addresses.  Id.
 193. See supra notes 96–111 and accompanying text. 
194. See MacMillan, supra note 189. 
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thirty days—cannot be within 200 feet of each other.195 And Mendocino
County, California, requires a ratio of “thirteen . . . long term residential 
dwelling units to either one . . . single unit rental or vacation home rental.”196 
In areas with high rates of short-term rental activity, this Comment
proposes establishing outreach programs and comprehensive regulatory
schemes to govern room-sharing.  Palm Springs, California, for example, 
has adopted detailed standards governing room-sharing activity.197  In  
addition to complying with local regulations, hosts also have duties designed
to minimize the impact of room-sharing, including ensuring guests are not
disorderly or unreasonably loud, requiring guests agree to comply with
local law, and responding to any complaints about the use of the property.198 
Cities should also address consumer safety concerns by requiring prospective 
hosts to obtain permits, conditioned on passing a safety inspection.  An 
initial inspection could require hosts to meet the same standards as a hotel 
to protect transient guests—for instance, clearly marked fire escapes and 
locking windows and doors could be required.  Conditioning the maintenance 
of a permit on passing yearly inspections would ensure that hosts maintain 
safe and secure lodgings. 
Finally, cities must make realistic choices about enforcing the new laws.
One issue with current regulatory approaches is that the sheer number of
room-sharing listings in some cities make inspection, ticketing, and 
enforcing any registration requirements, at worst, impossible and, at best, 
impractical.199  Although cities will likely choose to define what an accessory 
use is for the purpose of room-sharing—for instance, by number of days—an 
alternative exists.  Regulators could focus on the most flagrant offenders,
creating ex-post regulatory standards that target a certain top bracket of
the disclosed hosts.200  For instance, code enforcement could target the
hosts who rent for the most days per year without being present in their
homes.  With information available from sharing platform disclosures, the city
could choose an arbitrary percentage—perhaps the 10% of people who 
195. SAN LUIS OBISPO COUNTY, CAL., COASTAL ZONE LAND USE CODE § 23.08.165(c) 
(2012).
196. MENDOCINO COUNTY, CAL., ZONING CODE § 20.748.020(A) (1995). 
197. See PALM SPRINGS, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 5.25 (2014).
198. PALM SPRINGS, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.25.070(d), (f), (g) (2008). 
199. In San Francisco, the Chronicle estimates nearly 5,000 listings on Airbnb alone. 
Carolyn Said, Window into Airbnb’s Hidden Impact on S.F., S.F. CHRON. (June 2014),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/item/window-into-airbnb-s-hidden-impact-on-s-f-
30110.php [https://perma.cc/6M9W-5239].  The New York Attorney General’s office 
estimates 16,483 units booked in New York City during the first five months of 2014 
alone. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. OF N.Y., supra note 9, at 6.
200. As one San Francisco commentator points out, without more stringent requirements,
it is unlikely that many San Franciscans will comply with the new law. See Said, supra
note 161. 
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host most frequently, or a flat threshold that targets rentals for more than
thirty days per year—to focus on.201 
Similar strategic regulation tactics have been proposed in the securities 
market to cure problems with disclosure requirements by creating broad 
standards by which to judge compliance after the fact.202  This approach
critiques disclosure requirements for allowing participants wiggle room
that incentivizes them to cheat the system—for instance, to give opaque 
disclosures and overwhelm authorities with information.203  Instead, a
standards-based model creates uncertainty by choosing an arbitrary, flexible 
group of offenders to target—a strategy which tends toward creating over-
compliance, rather than participants searching for loopholes, and which
allows local governments flexibility as they decide how to implement the 
new room-sharing regulations. 
Other commentators have suggested stricter standards, proposing that 
in addition to enforcing new, comprehensive ordinances, local governments
should enact stricter “noise limits, property care standards, public gathering
ordinances, curfews, and general parking restrictions.”204  Enforcing these
ordinances ensures that the secondary effects of room-sharing are
controlled.205  But while perhaps ideal, stricter enforcement is not practical 
if municipal budgets are already stretched; local governments must consider
201. The federal government took a similar, rather arbitrary approach in applying
“short swing” rules to stocks.  “Short swing rules” are laws restricting insiders of a company
from making short-term profits and intended to guard against so-called insider trading. 
See  WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS: AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND
CORPORATIONS 511 (6th ed. 2006).  Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
allows recovery of profits from sales of stock made by corporate insiders and principal
shareholders if resulting from a sale within six months from the stock’s purchase.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 8, 48 Stat. 881, 896 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012)).  Section 16(b) does not take into
account either the “intent of the insider or the existence of actual speculation” when forcing 
an insider to forego profits made on sales of his company’s stock within six months of
purchase. Bershad v. McDonough, 428 F.2d 693, 696 (7th Cir. 1970).  Instead, it creates 
“a relatively arbitrary rule capable of easy administration” adopted by Congress “to insure 
the optimum prophylactic effect.” Id. The government simply targets trading within
shorter periods as an indicia of the existence of insider trading, rather than investigating
each potentially culpable transaction.
202. See generally Frank Partnoy, The Right Way to Regulate from Behind, 18 N.C.
BANKING INST. 113 (2013).
203. See id. at 116. 
204. See Charles Gottlieb, Residential Short-Term Rentals: Should Local Governments
Regulate the “Industry”?, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 4, 6 (2013). 
205. Id. at 7. 
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the pervasiveness of room-sharing and other practical concerns when
determining how to deal with the sharing industry on a local level. 
On the state level, lawmakers should consider whether they want to
allow short-term rentals, preempting local regulation.  For instance, in a
striking move to protect the room-sharing industry, Florida’s legislature 
passed a 2011 bill amending state law to prevent “local governments from
regulating, restricting, or prohibiting vacation rentals based solely on their 
classification, use, or occupancy.”206  The legislature intended the bill to
protect the thriving local short-term rental business; however, in 2014, the
state changed the text of the statute again and reauthorized local regulations
in an attempt to regain control of the vacation rental industry.207 The 
short-lived change to Florida law indicates the lobbying influence of hotel 
industries, particularly in areas relying on the tourist industry.208 
A similar state law could broadly address all local municipalities by 
stating that short-term rentals are legal.  Such a state law might only have
a limited effect on urban areas, as some city charters limit the extent to 
which states can regulate local governments’ administration of “municipal 
affairs.”209  For instance, in California, under some circumstances, the
ordinances of a city charter will supersede state law.210  As such, this
Comment focuses on local regulation—at least on the municipal level—as 
the most useful.  However, a state law would have a more powerful effect
in unincorporated and rural areas of the state.211 
VI. CONCLUSION
For increasingly tech-savvy and socially networked Americans, the sharing 
economy provides a creative and cost-friendly alternative to industries 
dominated by traditional business models.212  Airbnb and its competitors
206.  H.B. 883, 22d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2011) (modifying Fla. Stat. § 509.032). 
207. Id.; see Sarah Kennedy, Bradenton’s Sen. Galvano Proposes Amendment to 
Vacation Rental Bill, BRADENTON HERALD (Mar. 20 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.braden 
ton.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article34710411.html [https://perma.cc/
8AW3-NBCZ] (explaining the intention of the legislature in introducing the original bill). 
208. Dennis Schaal, How Online Travel Agency Lobbyists Helped Kill Florida Hotel 
Tax Lawsuit, SKIFT (Oct. 29, 2014, 3:00 PM), http://skift.com/2014/10/29/how-online­
travel-agency-lobbyists-helped-kill-florida-hotel-tax-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/K2W6-58F2].
209. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing the home rule doctrine).
210. Brett A. Stroud, Preserving Home Rule: The Text, Purpose, and Political Theory of
California’s Municipal Affairs Clause, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 587, 588 (2014) (citing CAL.
CONST. art. 11, § 5).
211. Although state residents in these areas are less likely to have a market for their
residences, because Airbnb and related sites operate primarily in populous tourism centers, 
the law would at least ensure no municipalities grant preferential treatment to their own 
residents. 
212. See supra notes 24–26. 
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have capitalized on users’ need for affordable, flexible vacation housing
by allowing apartment and homeowners to rent out their unused space.
As urban centers gentrify, increasingly high costs of living coupled with
financial hardship makes room-sharing a valuable supplement to hosts’
household incomes.213 
Room-sharing is a positive for most. It enables more people to afford to 
live in expensive urban centers, encourages competition with the hotel 
industry, promotes community values and plausibly environmentally-friendly 
behavior, and provides a source of taxable revenue for local governments. 
Unfortunately, with the boom of room-sharing comes the bane of thousands
of residents turning over their residences to strangers in a mostly unregulated, 
unsupervised new industry.  In addition to putting guests at risk, for those
living near hosts, room-sharing can mean the unwelcome invasion of 
their neighborhoods, resulting in increased foot traffic and questionable 
community safety. 
Recognizing that short-term housing necessitates regulation comparable to
the hotel and bed-and-breakfast industries, city and state governments 
must decide on regulatory amendments to address room-sharing.  Local 
governments could follow the lead of San Francisco and Portland and
provide legal templates for short-term rentals; alternatively, local governments
could simply adopt their regulations to allow room-sharing as a form of
bed-and-breakfast or travel home. 
Regardless of how municipalities choose to regulate room-sharing, 
regulation must be addressed.  The boom of the sharing economy has caught 
many participants and regulators unaware of the legal aspects of peer-to­
peer platforms, a consequence best addressed by immediate local action.214
 213. See Sal Rosselli, Health Care Workers Struggle with Cost of Living in SF, S.F.
EXAMINER (Dec. 10, 2014), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/health-care-workers- 
struggle-with-cost-of-living-in-sf/Content?oid=2913898 [https://perma.cc/PXU4-SR8N].
214. See Suzanne Carlson, Connecticut’s Thriving Airbnb Community Is Catching 
Officials Unaware, HARTFORD COURANT (Oct. 20, 2014, 9:38 AM), http://www.courant.
com/community/west-hartford/hc-west-hartford-town-cracks-down-on-airbnb-20141020­
story.html#page=1 [https://perma.cc/8DUF-M3TM] (explaining how West Hartford officials 
are baffled by how to regulate Airbnb listings in their area). 
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